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Abstract
This study investigates the prevalence and extent of altruism by examining the relationship
between parents’ and their adult children’s subjective well-being in a data set extracted from
the German Socio-Economic Panel. In order to segregate the share of parents with altruistic
preferences from those who are selfish, we estimate a finite mixture regression model. We control
for various sources of potential bias by taking advantage of the data’s panel structure. To validate
our modeling approach we show that predicted altruists indeed make higher average transfer
payments.
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1 Introduction
Happiness data are increasingly used to tackle important problems in economics, as reviewed by Frey
and Stutzer (2002), Layard (2005), or Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006). Indeed, the recent surge in
interest is quite dramatic, as pointed out by Clark et al. (2006), who counted 417 happiness-related
articles in Econlit between 1960 and 2005, 76% of which had been published since 1995 and 30%
since 2003. Most of these papers use, in one way or another, responses to current happiness or life
satisfaction questions in cross-section and panel survey data to study the factors motivating individual
behavior, as well as the effects of behavior, policies and institutions, on well-being. With the odd
exception, much of the previous literature takes a purely individualistic approach to happiness.
The aim of this study is to broaden the existing literature by focusing on positive preference in-
terdependence as in Becker (1981), which may result in altruistic behavior. The question how widely
and to what extent altruistic preferences are present in the population is important in various fields
of economics. In public economics, the presence of altruism in a substantial fraction of the population
may, by adjusting charitable giving and other voluntary transfers, neutralize governmental attempts
at redistributing income between generations (Laferrere and Wolff, 2006). In macroeconomic growth
modeling, it is crucial to distinguish between two different motivations for intergenerational transfer
payments, altruism or joy of giving (Barro, 1974; Bertola et al., 2006). With altruism, individuals’
preferences exhibit positive interdependence so that their current utility levels correspond to the
discounted utility flows of all future generations, which results in an infinite planning horizon. In-
dividuals motivated solely by joy of giving, however, do not care about the utility of their offspring
and, consequently, their bequests will be driven solely by the utility obtained from donating per
se. This supports an overlapping generations point of view instead of an infinite planning horizon.
Moreover, as Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) point out, when markets are imperfect even a minority of
people exhibiting some sort of social preferences, such as altruism, can have a major impact on the
equilibrium.
In contrast to other studies on altruism, which rely on the analysis of consumption levels and
transfers, we focus on subjective well-being as an immediate indicator of utility. Besides being
straightforward, this approach allows us to identify altruistic preferences even in a case where the
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income gap between parents and their children is not wide enough to trigger transfer payments.
Imagine a situation where the parents’ and their children’s marginal utility of income are almost
the same. In such a case the parents’ marginal disutility of reduced consumption associated with
a transfer payment is likely to exceed the marginal utility gained from a transfer induced increase
in the children’s happiness. So, even if these parents have altruistic preferences in the sense that
they care for their children’s happiness, this is not revealed in transfer or consumption patterns.
However, by directly analyzing the dependence of the parents’ utility on their children’s subjective
well-being our approach allows us to still detect altruistic preferences even in the absence of any
transfer payments.
Our analysis is based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a representative
annual panel survey initiated in 1984. As the panel population ages, children become adults, move
out of their parental homes and set up their own households. The GSOEP has the nice feature that
it surveys these descendants’ households as well, and thus allows us to generate linked parent-child
observations. Between 2000 and 2004, we observe a total of 2,577 interviewed parents with at least
one child living in a spin-off household. As these parents are observed in several waves of the panel,
and some of them have more than just one adult child who has left home, the number of linkable
parent-child pairs amounts to 11,330. Each of these pairs is observed on average for slightly more
than 3 years.
Winkelmann (2005), using GSOEP data as well but a different sample including children still
at home, reports a long-run correlation of 0.4 to 0.5 in subjective well-being between parents and
children. In principle, there are at least three different explanations for this finding: First, attitudes
towards well-being may be genetically transmitted. Second, parents and children may share, to some
extent, the same environmental and socio-economic attributes. Third, the correlation may be due
to a direct, positive, and causal dependence of the parents’ utility functions on the utility of their
adult children, i.e. altruism. In order to isolate the latter effect, we suggest an estimation strategy
based on panel data.
We know from experimental economic research that there exist several distinct social preference
types, and at least a minority of people seem to exhibit altruistic preferences (see for example Fehr
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and Schmidt (2002)). Besides reporting vast heterogeneity, Andreoni and Miller (2002), for example,
find evidence based on a series of Dictator Games that about 23% of their participants treat their own
and the other’s payoffs as perfect substitutes, a behavior compatible with altruism. Phelps (2001)
conducts Thematic Apperception Tests, a battery of psychological tests aimed at identifying altruistic
motivation, and finds that around 20% of the participants responded in an altruistic manner. We
will compare our estimates of the prevalence of altruistic preferences, based on survey data, with
these findings, gained by applying completely different methodologies in other fields of economic and
psychological research.
By estimating a finite mixture regression model we account for unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. the
existence of different social preference types, and isolate the share of altruists in a representative
household sample. Distinguishing between two preference types allows us to separate the fraction
of altruistic parents from the remainder of the sample, which is assumed to behave selfishly.1 As
the finite mixture model endogenously assigns a group membership (altruistic/selfish) probability to
each parent, we can test on an individual level how altruism corresponds to transfer payments. This
allows us to check the plausibility of the endogenous group assignment, as we expect parents with
altruistic preferences to pay - at least on average - higher transfers towards their children.
In Section 2 the structure of the data set is discussed in greater detail, and descriptive statistics
are provided. Section 3 covers the basic econometric model, an extensions to account for household-
specific effects, and estimation. Section 4 presents and interprets the results, while Section 5 con-
cludes.
2 Data Structure and Descriptive Statistics
The analysis is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), an annual survey of house-
holds, which was started in 1984 in West Germany and extended to East Germany in 1990 (Wagner
et al., 1993). As mentioned above, it is an important feature of the GSOEP that it follows up on
adult children who moved out of their parental homes and may now live in their own families. In
more recent waves of the GSOEP, the number of such children living in spin-off households has
become large enough to permit empirical studies of parent-child pairs.
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We analyze data for the years 2000-2004.2 In a first step, we extract 2,577 distinct parents with
at least one traced child living in a spin-off household. Note that, since for any given parent the
number of these children varies between one and five, the number of observed parent-child pairs is
higher than the actual number of parents in the data set. Table 1 summarizes the data structure for
each wave of the panel. For example, among the 1,616 parents observed in the year 2000 wave, 1,205
parents have only one child living outside the parental household. The remaining 411 parents have
several children, so that the total number of observed parent-child pairs adds up to 2,108. The panel
is not balanced, as the number of both parents and parent-child pairs varies over time. In total, the
data set contains 8,775 parent observations and 11,330 parent-child pair observations.
−−−−−−−−−
Insert table 1 here.
−−−−−−−−−
Beside a broad range of socio-economic variables, the GSOEP provides information on subjec-
tive well-being which can be interpreted as a direct measure of individual utility and, thus, is of
central interest to this paper. All respondents are asked directly about their general life satisfac-
tion by the following question: “How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered? Please
answer according to the following scale: 0 means completely dissatisfied, 10 means completely sat-
isfied”. Since general life satisfaction is measured on an ordinal scale, it needs special consideration
in regression models, with parent’s well-being as dependent variable and children’s well-being as
explanatory variable. Section 3 discusses these issues in greater detail.
For both parents and children, we extract the following characteristics from the data set, which
are generally thought of as being important determinants of subjective well-being (see for example
Frey and Stutzer (2001)): health, age, employment status, monthly disposable income, household
size, marital status, and mean geographical distance between the parental household and the spin-off
households. Health is measured on a self-reported five-point scale which is, for simplicity, converted
into an indicator variable of good health status for the highest two values. In contrast to other
studies, such as Clark and Oswald (1994), who find evidence for an U-shaped effect of ageing on
reported subjective well-being with a minimum around 35 years, age is included among the other
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regressors only in linear form. Since all the parents in the sample are at least 32 years of age, the
effect of ageing is expected to be nearly monotonically and positively associated with general life
satisfaction. We measure the mean distance in kilometers between the parents’ households and their
spin-off households based on the geographical coordinate of the country’s midpoint, as discussed by
Schwarze and Winkelmann (2005). As it is plausible that parents know less about their children the
farther away they live, this provides a proxy measure for the parent’s general knowledge about their
children’s living conditions.
Parents may exhibit paternalistic preferences, that is to say, they do not only care about their
children’s well-being but they may derive direct utility from other attributes of their children, such as
education, marital status, and income, regardless of the effect of these attributes on their children’s
well-being, i.e. for a given level of well-being. If this is the case, adding the children’s socio-economic
characteristics as controls is crucial for obtaining an unbiased estimator of the prevalence and extent
of altruistic preferences.
Additionally, the data set contains information on the annual amount of monetary transfers paid
to the children by their parents. This variable is interesting for two reasons: First, if the parents’
motivation for paying transfers is joy of giving or reciprocity instead of altruism, we expect parents’
well-being to be positively associated with these transfers ceteris paribus, i.e. for a given level of
the child’s well-being. Thus, we should include it among the other control variables. Second, after
assigning each parent to one of the two groups, it allows us to compare the average transfer payments
of the altruistic parents with the selfish ones.
−−−−−−−−−
Insert table 2 here.
−−−−−−−−−
Table 2 reveals that children report, on average, a much better health status than their parents,
and the mean difference in age between parents and children is about 27 years. Due to their lower age,
but possibly also because of secular trends in cohabitation, fewer children than parents are married.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and we see that the mean differences are statistically
significant.
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3 Model
3.1 Basic Model
Our basic modeling framework is an extension of the standard ordered probit model which allows us
to endogenously separate altruistic parents from those who are assumed to be selfish. Let hit = j,
j = 0, 1, . . . , 10, denote the ordered response of parent i at time t on the 11-point happiness scale.
Similarly, vit is the ordered response of parent i’s child at time t. If there is more than one child, vit
is taken to be the response of parent i’s child at time t.
The main object of interest is P (hit = j|xit), the conditional probability model for the ordered
response of the parents’ happiness, where xit = (xit1, . . . , xitk)′ is a (k × 1) vector of determinants
of subjective well-being, discussed in the previous section, excluding a constant. If we assume an
ordered probit formulation with a linear index function x′itβ = xit1β1 + . . .+ xitkβk, as in McKelvey
and Zavoina (1975), we obtain
P (hit = j|xit) = Φ(κj − x′itβ)− Φ(κj−1 − x′itβ) , (1)
where κj > κj−1 are threshold values, and Φ denotes the cumulative density function of the standard
normal distribution.
In order to account for heterogeneity in the parents’ preference types we introduce an indicator
variable, ai, such that ai = 0 if parent i is selfish and does not care for the well-being of her
adult child, and ai = 1 if she is altruistic. For altruistic parents, their children’s well-being, vit,
becomes one of the determinants of their own utility, and we therefore expect its coefficient, η, to be
positive. Whereas for selfish parents, the children’s well-being has no effect on their own general life
satisfaction. This yields the conditional probability model’s basic form
P (hit = j|xit, vit, ai) = Φ(κj − x′itβ − aiηvit)− Φ(κj−1 − x′itβ − aiηvit) . (2)
In this formulation, the child’s well-being, vit, enters as an explanatory variable. Since we treat
the parents’ happiness hit as an ordinal variable, we should, by symmetry, make the same assumption
on the child’s well-being. It is not immediately obvious how this can be done in a regression context.
Rather than including indicator variables for each possible response value (in which case we lose the
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ordering information), we follow Terza (1987) and replace vit by a cardinalization that is compatible
with the ordered probit assumption, i.e., an underlying normally distributed latent linear index v∗it.
The children’s subjective well-being responses are replaced by their conditional expectations
v˜it = E(v∗it|vit = j) = E(v∗it|µ(j−1) ≤ v∗it < µ(j)) =
φ(µ(j−1))− φ(µ(j))
Φ(µ(l))− Φ(µ(j−1))
, (3)
where µ(j)s denote the quantiles of the standard normal distribution for the sample cumulative
relative frequencies of the eleven response categories j = 0, 1, . . . , 10, and φ stands for the standard
normal density. To test the robustness of our results we modeled children’s well-being as an indicator,
which takes on the value 1 if vit > 4 and zero otherwise, instead of applying Terza’s cardinalization.
Besides the obvious loss in efficiency our estimates remained largely unaffected.
We include the well-being index of the representative (=average) child for parents with several
children in the above expression. Therefore, we implicitly assume that parents weight their children’s
well-being equally.3 To simplify the interpretation of the model, v˜it is centered around zero which
ensures that its effect on the parents’ happiness is captured solely by η and does not have any
influence on the vector of threshold parameters κj .
3.2 Extensions
So far the model assumes a pooled data structure and does not take advantage of the fact that the
panel data set contains up to five observations on each parent over time. The data’s panel structure,
however, may help to resolve some of the potential endogeneity problems.
First, if there is unobserved variation in the parents’ permanent consumption levels which is
correlated with the children’s consumption due to some unobserved time-unvarying family-specific
effects, αi, the children’s well-being, vi, is endogenous. Second, imagine a situation where both par-
ents and children share similar attitudes towards their life satisfaction, like being intrinsically happy
or unhappy. Such a correlation, for example due to genetic transmission, generates an endogeneity
problem as well. By ignoring these potential sources of endogeneity we would attribute the whole
correlation between parents’ and their children’s happiness to altruistic preferences even when, say by
genetic inheritance, intrinsically content parents may tend to have happier children. Consequently,
we would overestimate the weight of altruistic preferences.
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However, the data’s panel structure allows us to isolate that part of the correlation between
parents’ and their children’s happiness which is caused by altruistic preferences, as long as the
unobserved other causes, i.e. the family-specific effects αi, remain constant over time. In a linear
regression model we would eliminate αi and obtain a fixed-effects estimator by either taking first
differences or applying the within-transformation. Unfortunately, due the ordered probit’s nonlinear
form neither is possible. A dummy variable approach is ruled out as well, since it consumes too
many degrees of freedom and leads to an incidental parameters problem with inconsistent maximum
likelihood estimators.
To be able to address time-unvarying unobservable effects in probit formulations all the same,
Mundlak (1978) proposed to model the correlation between the unobserved time-constant effects and
the regressors directly. In our case, by assuming that the family-specific effects, αi, are normally
distributed conditional on the individual means, x¯ and ¯˜v, such that
αi|x¯i, ¯˜vi ∼ N(x¯′iδ1 + δ2¯˜vi, σ2α) , (4)
their long-run correlation with the dependent variable, hit, can be segregated from the effect of
altruistic preferences. As the sum of two normal distributions is again normally distributed, we
obtain the following conditional probability model which accounts for family-specific effects:
P (hit = j|xi, vi, ai) =
Φ(κj − x′itβ − aiηv˜it − x¯′iδ1 − δ2¯˜vi)− Φ(κj−1 − x′itβ − aiηv˜it − x¯′iδ1 − δ2¯˜vi) , (5)
where η measures the causal effect of the children’s on their parents’ happiness. Note that all
parameters are now scaled by an unidentified but constant factor
(
1 + σ2α
)−1/2. This scaling can be
safely ignored, as it cancels out, as long as we base our inference on standard errors obtained by
the bootstrap method, and interpret the parameter estimates either in terms of marginal probability
effects or relative sizes.
3.3 Estimation of the Model
In order to estimate the model we have to deal with the fact that we cannot directly observe a given
parent’s preference type, i.e. a priori we do not know whether she is selfish or altruistic. In the
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following, we discuss our estimation strategy which allows us to overcome this kind of incomplete-data
problem. We also briefly address some issues which typically arise during the maximum likelihood
estimation of a finite mixture model.
The conditional probability model directly translates into the parent’s type-specific density, which
can be written as
f(hi|xi, vi, ai) =
Ti∏
t=1
f(hit|xi, vi, ai) . (6)
As we do not observe the indicator ai directly, parent i’s preference type is unknown a priori.
Therefore, we have to weight her type-specific density by the probability that she belongs to the
corresponding type, which equals this type’s relative size. This yields the model’s log likelihood
function
lnL(Ψ;x, v) =
N∑
i=1
ln [piaf(hi|xi, vi, ai = 1) + (1− pia) f(hi|xi, vi, ai = 0)] , (7)
where pia is the share of altruists in the population and Ψ = (β′, δ′, κ′, η, pia)′ denotes a vector contain-
ing all the unknown parameters of the model which need to be estimated. As in any finite mixture
model (for a general treatise see McLachlan and Peel (2000)), the relative size of the altruists’s
group, pia, cannot be estimated separately from the remaining parameters of the conditional prob-
ability model. It is well known that this highly nonlinearform and the potential multimodality, the
existence of several local maxima, of the log likelihood function affect the speed of the optimization
algorithm negatively, or even prohibit locating the global maximum.
However, if individual group-membership ai were observed, Dempster and Laird (1977) show that
the so-called complete data log likelihood function would take on the much simpler form
ln L˜(Ψ;x, v, a) =
N∑
i=1
ai [ln pia + ln f(hi|xi, vi, ai = 1)] + (1− ai) [ln (1− pia) + ln f(hi|xi, vi, ai = 0)] . (8)
In this case, the estimated share of altruists, pˆia = 1/N
∑N
i=1 ai, would be given analytically and
the maximum likelihood estimates of the remaining parameters could be obtained separately by
numerically maximizing the corresponding type-specific densities.
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Dempster and Laird’s Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm now proceeds iteratively in two
steps, E and M. During the E-step, given the actual fit of the data, an a posteriori probability of
being an altruist is obtained for each parent according to Bayes’ Law by
τa,i =
piaf(hi|xi, vi, ai = 1)
piaf(hi|xi, vi, ai = 1) + (1− pia) f(hi|xi, vi, ai = 0) . (9)
In the M-step, the complete data log likelihood is maximized, where the unobserved indicator ai is
replaced by these a posteriori probabilities of belonging to the altruistic group. Note that, beside
being able to deal with the nonlinearity of the log likelihood function, the EM-Algorithm also allows
us, based on these τa,i, to endogenously classify each parent as being either altruistic or selfish.
The problems caused by multimodality can be addressed by implementing a stochastic version of
the EM algorithm, such as the Simulated Annealing Expectation Maximization (SAEM) algorithm
developed by Celeux et al. (1996). In each iteration, it has a positive probability of leaving a once
taken path to convergence and starting over in a different region of the log likelihood function. This
results in much higher chances of converging to the global maximum but comes at the cost of even
higher computational demands than the standard EM algorithm. The estimation routine, which we
programmed in the R environment (R Development Core Team, 2005), therefore uses a hybrid form
(Render and Walker, 1984) of the SAEM algorithm, which is more reliable in the detection of the
global maximum, and the much faster BFGS algorithm.4
The lowest five categories of parents’ subjective well-being responses are only sparsely populated,
with 11.4 percent of all responses overall. For practical reasons, we collapsed those five responses into
a single category, ensuring that during the bootstrap estimation of the standard errors, all response
categories contain at least one observation in each subsample, a requirement for estimation of the full
model, with a sufficiently high probability. Moreover, in a single index model such as ours, combining
categories does not affect the estimator’s consistency. The only costs are some loss in efficiency and
the impossibility of predicting conditional outcome probabilities for the single components (which is
not essential for our research question). As several randomly generated start values all led to the
same maximum likelihood estimates the model seems to be well identified.
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4 Results
In this section, we present the results of total four finite mixture regressions. The first part deals with
model selection issues and therefore addresses the question of whether we need to control for family-
specific effects and alternative motivations for paying transfers, such as paternalistic preferences, joy
of giving, and reciprocity. The second part sheds light on our main research question by discussing
the prevalence and extent of altruistic preferences. Finally, we investigate whether parents who get
assigned to the group of altruists actually pay higher average transfers to their children.
4.1 Model Selection
Table 3 shows the maximum likelihood estimates of four different finite mixture ordered probit mod-
els, which all discriminate between selfish and altruistic parents by analyzing the direct dependence
of parental utility on children’s well-being. The standard errors, in parentheses, are based on the
bootstrap method and clustered by individuals to control for possible serial correlation. Not shown
in the Table are coefficients on four time dummies in each model that capture a potential time trend
in happiness as well as the Mundlak parameter estimates δˆ1 and δˆ2 in the family-effects models.
Model 1 represents the baseline as it only uses the parents’ socio-economic characteristics as
controls and makes no use of the data’s panel structure. While still assuming the data to be pooled
over time, Model 2 includes the children’s socio-economic characteristics as well. Thus, it takes
into account that parents may not only care about their children’s happiness but obtain utility
directly from their offsprings’s socio-economic status, too. In such a case, we should control for these
paternalistic preferences and prefer Model 2 over Model 1 in order to avoid omitted variable bias.
As mentioned in Section 3.2, there may exist unobserved family-specific effects which result in an
endogeneity problem and lead to biased estimators as well. In contrast to their pooled counterparts,
1 and 2, the models 3 and 4 use the data’s panel structure to control for such time-unvarying
unobserved effects by applying Mundlak’s formulation. They therefore take the potential correlation
between the regressors and these effects into account. Consequently, they consistently identify parents
with altruistic preferences even when correlated family-specific effects are present. Since the family-
effects models include the individual means over time of all regressors, x¯ and ¯˜v, we have to exclude
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the variables age, years of schooling, and gender (but not their means over time) in order to avoid
perfect multicollinearity. The number of parameters therefore rises by 8 if we go from Model 1 to
Model 3, and by 13 from Model 2 to Model 4 respectively.5
Looking at the estimated parameters in Table 3, we find the results of all four models to be in line
with prior findings in the happiness literature. Health and income both show a significant positive
effect on parent’s subjective well-being, whereas the impact of unemployment is highly significantly
negative. As expected, the effect of good health is very large in relative size.6 With the exception of
log-household size, which is insignificant in the family-effects model, all coefficients preserve the same
sign. Furthermore, as the parameter estimates in the family effects models only rely on variation
within the individuals over time, it comes at no surprise that their standard errors are generally
larger than these estimated from the pooled models.
−−−−−−−−−
Insert table 3 here.
−−−−−−−−−
While our main interest is in patterns regarding altruism, to be discussed in detail below, the
regressions also provide some evidence for the presence of paternalistic preferences, joy of giving, and
reciprocity.
A test for the presence of paternalistic preferences comes down to the question whether the
coefficients of the children’s socio-economic characteristics are jointly significant. Two likelihood ratio
tests (model 2 against model 1, and model 4 against model 3) show that the null-hypothesis of the
absence of paternalistic preferences has to be rejected (the p-values are 0.028 and 0.042, respectively).
Thus we conclude that parents care directly for their children’s socio-economic standing, which rules
out models 1 and 3. Since the remaining two models, 2 and 4, are not nested, they cannot be tested
against each other. A comparison based on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) reveals a slight
advantage for the family effects model.
With regards to joy of giving, a necessary condition for such an effect is that transfers increase
a parent’s happiness ceteris paribus, i.e. for a given happiness of the child. This condition is not
sufficient, though, as there may be other explanations why transfers can be associated with increased
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happiness. One is that parents in a better financial situation give more to their children, and they
may be happier for that very reason, i.e., the better financial situation, rather than the transfers
per se. Therefore, it is important to eliminate this potential confounding effect by controlling for
parental income. Second, the observed transfers could be a ”pay-back” for received, or anticipated
future services that children provide for their parents. We do not observe such services in the data.
Hence, we cannot exclude that part of the transfer effect is due to reciprocity rather than joy of
giving proper. From model 4 with family effects (p-value=0.028) or model 2 for the pooled panel
(p-value=0.015), there is evidence that transfers have a statistically significant positive effect on well-
being, after controlling for income as well as the child’s utility. Thus, joy of giving and/or reciprocity
appear to be motives for transfers as well.
4.2 Prevalence and Extent of Altruistic Preferences
The main parameters of interest, pˆia, the estimated fraction of altruists, and ηˆ, the extent of in-
terdependence in the altruists’ preferences, are highly significant with p-values close to zero in all
models. The estimated fraction of altruists is larger (27.4%) in the pooled model than in the model
which accounts for family-effects (21.4%), although the difference is not statistically significant. All
in all, the estimated share of altruists is comparable in magnitude to the 20% reported by Phelps
(2001) who relies on psychological tests in a U.S. survey. So, even if we apply a completely different
methodology and examine members of the same family instead of strangers, we obtain results that
are qualitatively similar to those of Phelps’. Furthermore, our estimates for the spread of altruism
are also similar to the fraction of people who treat their own and others’ payoffs as perfect substitutes
in dictator games (Andreoni and Miller, 2002). This indicates that, after controlling for children’s
socio-economic characteristics and parents’ income as well as applying a family-effects estimator,
survey based estimates can provide some meaningful information on preference interdependence and
altruism.
As in any other standard ordered probit model, only the signs of the coefficients within a certain
group of the finite mixture ordered probit model have a direct interpretation (Boes and Winkelmann,
2006). Arguably, the most intuitive way of interpreting the quantitative effect of the representative
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child’s well-being in the group of altruistic parents is to compute its average marginal probability
effect (AMPE) of observing a certain parental response with regard to well-being. To compute the
AMPE, each parent has to be classified either as being altruistic or selfish. This is achieved by
assigning each parent to the altruists whose a posteriori probability, τa,i, is greater than 50%. By
definition marginal probability effects are zero in the group of selfish parents.
−−−−−−−−−
Insert table 4 here.
−−−−−−−−−
Table 4 shows the AMPE of the child’s well-being in the group of altruistic parents.7 For example,
a permanent unit increase in v˜it (i.e. a one standard deviation increase) would, ceteris paribus,
boost the probability of observing the most frequent subjective well-being response, h = 8, by 8.7
percentage points in model 2 and 7.8 percentage points in model 4.
4.3 Transfer Payments by Preference Type
If the model correctly identifies the parents with altruistic preferences, we expect them to be on
average more likely to make transfers to their children. Even though, as argued before, not all the
parents in the altruistic group necessarily need to pay actual transfers. As we have both the transfer
payments and the individual probabilities of being an altruist we can run a regression to check and
quantify this association.
−−−−−−−−−
Insert table 5 here.
−−−−−−−−−
Table 5 shows the results of two OLS regressions of the annual transfer amount, paid by the
parents to their representative child, on the a posteriori probabilities τa,i from models 2 and 4.
These regressions control for various socio-economic characteristics of the parents and their children.
As expected, parents’ income shows a significant positive sign, whereas the average child’s income
is negatively correlated with transfers paid by the parents. Parental household size also shows the
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expected negative sign, and parents with higher education seem to be more willing to pay transfers
to their children. Most interestingly, the results show a significant positive relationship between
transfer payments and the individual a posteriori probabilities of having altruistic preferences.8 In
both models, the estimated transfer amount is roughly 1, 000 Euros higher for altruistic parents than
it is for the rest of the population. The fact that parents to whom the model assigns a high probability
of having altruistic preferences indeed pay, on average, much higher transfers to their children, gives
us a strong indication that the econometric model is capable of identifying the altruists in the data
set.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate the share of parents with altruistic preferences in a data set stemming from
a representative annual survey, the GSOEP. The panel structure of the data allows us to control for
various sources of bias, such as paternalistic preferences, genetically transmitted inclinations towards
general life satisfaction or any other sort of time-invariant family-specific effects. The estimated share
of altruists lies between 21% to 27% of the population, depending on whether the model accounts
for family-specific effects or not. When we control for family-specific effects the estimated fraction
of altruists, which lies around one fifth, coincides roughly with the findings of two recent studies
relying on different, psychological (Phelps, 2001) as well as experimental (Andreoni and Miller,
2002), methodologies and data sets.
The estimated size of the effect of the children’s reported life satisfaction on their altruistic
parents’ subjective well-being is both robust and relatively large in terms of marginal probability
effects. Besides altruism, we find evidence that joy of giving and/or reciprocity provide an additional
motivation for parents to pay transfers to their children.
Furthermore, we have shown that actual transfers to the children are on average considerably
larger for parents who get, with a high probability, assigned to the altruistic group. This provides
strong evidence that the econometric model, on average, correctly identifies the parents with altruistic
preferences as these individuals show a consistent behavior in their transfer payments. Our approach,
which is based on a finite mixture model to account for heterogeneity in preference types and relies
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on subjective well-being as immediate proxy for utility, seems therefore to be well suited to estimate
the share of altruists in panel surveys such as the GSOEP.
Finally, the finding that some parents’ subjective well-being positively depends on the happiness
of their children living in spin-off households confirms the results of other studies that altruistic
preferences are present in at least a minority of the population. While this study focuses on altruism,
further research has to show whether other cleanly segregated social preference types exist and how
they relate to existing theories of other-regarding preferences. Such a deeper understanding of the
heterogeneity in preferences may be crucial in determining equilibria, especially when markets are
imperfect. So far, we conclude that altruistic preferences are substantial in their prevalence as well
as their extent, and they are likely to play an important role in public economics.
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Notes
1A related approach has been previously applied by Clark et al. (2005) in the context of estimating the responses
of well-being to income changes.
2The 2004 wave was the latest release when this research was started. Before 2000, the number of child spin-offs
was relatively small, and we therefore took 2000 as our initial year.
3Schwarze and Winkelmann (2005) find that their results remain robust when running the analysis on a subset of
parents having a single child. Therefore, the assumption of a representative child seems to be justified.
4The Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) algorithm is a Quasi-Newton method which allows solving uncon-
strained non-linear optimization problems (see for example Broyden (1970)). It is one of the standard hill-climbing
optimization routines implemented in the R environment as well as other statistical packages such as STATA.
5A further potential source of bias, not explicitly considered so far, can arise due to simultaneity, if children’s utility
depends on their parents’ utility as well. To consider the empirical relevance of such a possibility, we performed a
Rivers-Vuong-Test (Rivers and Vuong, 1988) in a pooled standard ordered probit model with the children’s age and
gender as instruments. The fact that the estimated residuals from the first-stage linear regression of the test were not
significant in the ordered probit estimation of the second stage (p-value=0.37), means that the absence of simultaneity
bias could not be rejected.
6The absolute size of the coefficients in the family-effects model cannot be compared directly to their pooled models’
correspondents, as they are scaled by an unidentified, but constant factor (1 + σ2α)
1/2.
7By definition, the AMPEs have to sum up to zero in both models. The small differences (0.001) from zero in the
results reported in table 4 are due to rounding error.
8If we exclude transfers in model 2 and 4, the classification and, consequently, the results remain stable. Therefore,
the dependence of τa,i on transfers paid seems negligible.
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A Tables
Table 1: Data Structure
Number of children living Number of parent observations
outside the parental household 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000-2004
One 1,205 1,279 1,313 1,377 1,458 6,632
Two 341 334 363 373 370 1,781
Three 63 51 61 77 74 326
Four 3 3 7 5 4 22
Five 4 4 2 2 2 14
Total 1,616 1,671 1,746 1,834 1,908 8,775
Total number of
parent-child pair observations 2,108 2,132 2,260 2,384 2,446 11,330
Source: GSOEP 2000-2004.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Means (Std.err. in parentheses) Parents Children
Subjective well-beinga 6.573 7.055
(0.019) (0.020)
Good health (yes=1/no=0) 0.311 0.697
(0.005) (0.006)
Age 57.4 30.7
(0.093) (0.075)
Unemployed (yes=1/no=0) 0.085 0.070
(0.003) (0.003)
Monthly income (in EUR) 4,567 4,030
(32.78) (25.97)
Female (yes=1/no=0) 0.542 0.513
(0.005) (0.006)
Years of schooling 11.2 12.3
(0.026) (0.031)
Household size 2.409 2.470
(0.011) (0.015)
Married (yes=1/no=0) 0.822 0.460
(0.004) (0.005)
Transfers paid per year (in EUR) 1,315
(60.14)
Distance between households (in kilometers) 48.2
(1.137)
Person-year Observations 8,775b 6,606c
a Measured on an 0, 1, . . . , 10 scale.
b Excludes multiple person-year observations for parents with several children.
c Excludes multiple person-year observations for children with two parents.
Source: GSOEP 2000-2004.
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Table 3: Finite Mixture Estimates of Parental Well-being. (N = 8, 775 observations)
Pooled over time Family Effects
Coefficients and (Std.err.a) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Fraction of altruists pˆia 0.277 0.274 0.210 0.214
(0.026) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Children’s well-being in the group 0.865∗∗ 0.873∗∗ 0.918∗∗ 0.912∗∗
of altruists ηˆ (0.064) (0.068) (0.094) (0.083)
Good health 0.762∗∗ 0.760∗∗ 0.299∗∗ 0.300∗∗
(0.033) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031)
Log-Income 0.480∗∗ 0.471∗∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.140∗
(0.039) (0.046) (0.057) (0.056)
Unemployed -0.384∗∗ -0.382∗∗ -0.222∗∗ -0.224∗∗
(0.065) (0.059) (0.062) (0.061)
Married 0.050 0.037 0.244 0.247
(0.060) (0.059) (0.139) (0.143)
Log-Household size -0.223∗∗ -0.206∗∗ 0.177 0.185
(0.063) (0.066) (0.091) (0.095)
Distance between households -0.054∗∗ -0.058∗∗ -0.003 -0.004
(0.015) (0.015) (0.031) (0.035)
Transfers paid (in 1,000 EUR) 0.005∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.005∗ 0.005∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ageb 0.185 0.147∗∗
(0.023) (0.036)
Good health of the average child 0.009 -0.041
(0.038) (0.032)
Log-Income of the average child -0.049 0.032
(0.041) (0.045)
Unemployment of the average child 0.013 0.054
(0.059) (0.053)
Average child is married 0.036 -0.012
(0.053) (0.055)
Log-Household size of the average child 0.016 0.009
(0.056) (0.064)
Age of the average childb 0.068
(0.055)
Years of schooling of the average childc 0.018
(0.010)
Average Child is femalec 0.019
(0.042)
Log-Likelihood -14,442.63 -14,434.04 -14,299.88 -14,288.39
Number of parameters 20 28 28 41
BIC 29,067 29,122 28,854 28,949
a All standard errors are clustered and obtained on the basis of 300 bootstrap replications.
b Only individual means over time are included in models 3 & 4 due to perfect time-dependence.
c Only individual means over time are included in model 4 due to time-invariance.
All models additionally contain six threshold parameters and four time dummies.
Models 3 & 4 contain additional parameters for the individual means over time.
Significance codes: ∗∗significant at α = 1%; ∗significant at α = 5%
Source: GSOEP 2000-2004.
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Table 4: Average Predicted Change in Happiness Distribution of Altruistic
Parents for a Standard Deviation Increase in Child Happiness Index.
Response Model 2 Model 4
category Estimates (Std.err.a) Estimates (Std.err.a)
Zero to four -0.155 (0.015) -0.163 (0.017)
Five -0.052 (0.007) -0.045 (0.009)
Six -0.017 (0.005) -0.012 (0.006)
Seven 0.009 (0.006) 0.011 (0.008)
Eight 0.087 (0.008) 0.078 (0.012)
Nine 0.060 (0.005) 0.055 (0.005)
Ten 0.069 (0.011) 0.075 (0.013)
a All standard errors are clustered and obtained on the basis of 300 bootstrap
replications.
Source: GSOEP 2000-2004.
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Table 5: Regressions of Transfer Amount. (N = 8, 775 observations)
OLS regression of
transfers (in 1,000 EUR)
Coefficients and (Std.err.a) Model 2b Model 4b
A posteriori probability 0.905∗ 1.000∗
of being an altruists τa,i (0.400) (0.490)
Good health -0.128 -0.122
(0.135) (0.132)
Log-Income 1.616∗∗ 1.619∗∗
(0.178) (0.219)
Unemployed -0.056 -0.053
(0.139) (0.143)
Married 0690∗∗ 0.686∗∗
(0.166) (0.160)
Log-Household size -1.634∗∗ -1.636∗∗
(0.213) (0.228)
Years of schooling 0.251∗∗ 0.251∗∗
(0.038) (0.043)
Good health of the average child -0.128 -0.124
(0.176) (0.180)
Log-Income of the average child -0.509∗∗ -0.509∗∗
(0.178) (0.179)
Unemployment of the average child 0.480 0.481
(0.532) (0.533)
Average child is married 0.690 0.221
(0.190) (0.195)
Log-Household size of the average child 0.087 0.085
(0.170) (0.180)
Years of schooling of the average child 0.047 0.047
(0.037) (0.037)
Intercept -10.901∗∗ -10.883∗∗
(1.933) (1.780)
R2 0.049 0.049
a All standard errors are clustered and obtained on the basis of 300 bootstrap replications.
Significance codes: ∗∗significant at α = 1%; ∗significant at α = 5%
Source: GSOEP 2000-2004.
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